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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintif{-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No.
12940

JAN GEORGE HAN"SEN,
Defend ant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
The appellant, .J a11 George Hansen, appeals from
a judgment and sentence entered against him in the
Third .J uclicial District Court convicting him of burglary
in the second degree.

DISPOSITION IN LO,V"ER COURT
The appellant was convicted of burglary in the
second degree before Judge Joseph G. Jeppson, in the
Third Judicial District Court, on the 10th day of March,
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1!>72. Ile was sentenced to serYe the indeterminate sentence as provided hy Jaw.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks reversal of the court below
with the direction that his ease be remanded.

STATEl\lEXT OF TIIE FACTS
The first poJiee officer testified that he entered
the store with the store manager and searched the store.
( R. ()()) Although he fournl no one in the main hody of
the store ( H. ()2), he did find chisel marks on the inside of the hack door (R. 61) and a box full of cigarettes and a six pack of beer plaeed h~r the hack door.
(H. H2) He further testified that he found the appellant in the attic of the store, but that he ne,'er saw the
appellant in he main body of the store. (H. 66, 67) AdditionaJly, he testified that appellant appeared to be
hysterical, appeared rather strange and failed to folJow
any of his instructions. ( ll. 6(), 70) This same officer,
who was familiar with narcotics, testified that appellant
appearecl to he under the influence of something, although he declined to state that appellant was under the
influence of drugs. (R. 71) He also testified that it
would not he uncommon for a person to use L.S.D. with
barbiturates. ( R. 76) Additiona11y, he testified that the
reaction of people who use barbiturates is to sleep a lot
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( R. 7u) :rn1l that the effects of L.S.D. on users are
variccl and weird. (R. 77)
The second police officer testified that the appellant did not seem to know what was going on and that
appellant appeared frightened. ( R. !)O) He further
testified that appellant appeared to be drunk. (R. 90,

Ul)

The store manager testified that he let the police
officers into tlie store and accompanied them. ( R. 79)
If e chec·ked the store and found that the cigarettes had
been disturbed ( H. 7U), that two registers had been
tampered with but not opened (R. 80) and that· the
back door had chisel marks on it. ( R. 84) He further
testified that he found a six pack of beer and six cartons of cigarettes in a box by the back door. (R. 81, 84)
AdditionalJy, he testified that appellant did not have
any permission to he in the store on that night. (R. 84)
The appellant, .Jan George Hansen, testified that
he took L.S.D. and barbiturates on the evening in question. ( R. !)8) Ile said that he dicl not remember being
arrested in the attic of the store nor being in the store.
( H.. IO 1, IOG), hut he remembered driving around and
seeing a castle and wanting to explore it. (R. 100, 104)
Appellant further testified that he had taken L.S.D.
many times and that each time he reacted differently,
but that this was the first time he had ever taken L.S.D.
and barbiturates together. (R. 101, 102) He said that
his unconsciousness of what took place was not a com-
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mon occurrence from taking L.S.D., hut was the effect
from taking harhiturates. ( R. l OJ )
The chemist testified that he wa:; familiar with
L.S.D. and that it is a halucinogenic drug because it distors one's perception to the point where he is no longer
accurately able to perceive his environment or the stimuli
coming to him. (R. 113) I-le further testified that he
was familiar with barbiturates and that they tend to produce sleep. (R. 115)

ARGUl\IEN'l'
POINT I
TIIJ;_: COUHT IJELO'\r ERRED IX REFUSING TO GIVE APPELLANT'S REC-~UESTED
INSTRUCTION l•'OR THE LESSER OFFENSE OF U:NLA,\TFUL ENTRY .
.Appellant contends that the court below erred in
refusing to give his requested instruction for the lesser
awl included offense of unlawful entry for the reason
that the evidence is insufficient to establish the specific
intent required in second degree burglary.
In State v. Er.•w1.<?, 74 U. 389, 279 P. 950 (1929),
at page 952, the court said that when the prosecution is

for burglary, the intent with which the defendant entered the building is the crux of the case.
In State v. Syddall, 20 U.2d '73, 433 P.2d IO

( HW7), at page 11, the court said that the graYamen
of the of f'ense of burglary in the secon<l degree is the
entry into a lmillli11g or _other enclosure mentioned in
the statute with a specific intent to commit larceny or
some other felony.

Appellant conternls that the evidence is insufficient
to establish that he entere!l the store with the specific
intent to commit larceny for the reason that he was under the influence of drugs at the time of such entry
arnl incapable of forming such intent. He further contencls that l1ei11g un<ler the influence of drugs can be
analogi,.;ecl to being intoxicated, and such intoxication
can preclude the formation of the specific intent.
I 11 State r·. 'l'urncr, 3 U.2d 285, 282 P.2d 1045.

( 1u:rn), the court recognizecl that as to certain offenses,
where specific intent is a necessary element, if the intoxication was such as to preclude the formation of such
intent, the fact of such intoxication may be shown to
negative this element.

In State l'. Ilartlc,11, rn U.2<l 123, 396 P.2d 749
( 1HG4), in a prosecution for second degree burglary,

the court recognized that intoxication, although voluntary, which precludes the formation of the necessary
intention, may be shown as a defense.
Specifically, appellant contends that he had the
right to have the question of intent submitted to the
jury by the instruction for the lesser and included offense of uu]awf'ul entry. Particularly the questions of

whether he entered the store with the intent to steal, or
to injure and annoy, or whether he was urnler the iPfluenee of drugs and unable to form the specific intent,
should have been submitted to the jury.
Furthermore, the well-established general rule, that
the jury should he instructed on the lesser and included
offense when such a conviction would he warranted by
any reasonable view of the evidence, is in accord with
and supported hy our statutory law. Section 77-33-6
F.C.A. rn5:3, provides that:
The jury may find the defea<lant guilty
of any offense the commission of ·which is
necessarily inelmle<l in that with which he is
charged in the indictment or information, or of
an attempt to commit the offense.
In State '1.'. Close, Xo. 1'25.34 (July 10, 1972), the
defernlant appealed from the conviction of indecent
assault upon a child under 14 alleging error in the refusal of the instruction for the lesser and inclmled offense of simple assault. The court reversed the conviction base<l upon the general rule of instructing the jury
on the lesser and included offense and 77-33-6.
In State

l:'. Brc1111a11,

13 U.2d 195, 371 I>.2d 27

( 19G2), at page 2U, the court said the rule as to when

one offense is included in another is that the greater
offense includes a lesser one when establishment of the
greater would necessarily include proof of all of the
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elcrncnts 11ct·essar~' to prove the lesser. In this case, the
comt found that the offense of driving a motor vehicle
under the in f111e11ee of liql!or was included in the greater
offe11se of <lriYing while intoxicated and injuring another in :t reckless or negligent manner, and the lower
court erre<l in refusing to give the instruction for the
lesser and incJU<led offense.
In State v. 111 cCarth,1;, 2;j U.2d 425, 483 P.2d 890
(Hl71), at page 8Hl the court affirmed the general rule

that when parties so request, they are entitled to instrudions 011 their theory of the case, including the submission of the lesser included offenses.

I 11 ,\'fate 'l'. Gilli(/11, 2:3 U.2d 372, 463 P.2d 811
( rn70), the court held that the lower court erred in refusing to giYe the requested instructions on the lesser
and included offenses. It said at page 812 that one of
the foundational principles in regard to the submission
of issue to juries is that where parties so request they are
entitled to have instructions given upon their theory of
the ease; an<l this includes on lesser offenses if any
reasonable view of the evidence would support such a
verdict.
The cvi<le11ce sliows that appe1lant apparently entered the store, di1l some tlamage inside the store, moved
arnl gatherecl some items, and was subsequently found
in the attic of the store. The evidence further shows that
appe1lant's cornlition at the time he was found appeared
strange, appeared that he was under the influence of
something. Appellant testified that he had taken L.S.D.
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mul harhiturates earlier that same e\'e11ing and that he
was 1111del' the influence of those drugs when he was
apprehended. Appellant fmther testified that he did
not remember being arrestecl in the attic of the store or
being in the store. 11ased upon the abO\'e evidence, appellant contends that the court erred in refusing to submit the question of intent to the jury by the instruction
for the included offense of unlawful entry.

CONCLUSION
For the reason ahoYe stated, that the court erred

in refusing to g'iYe appellant's requested instruction for
the lesser and included offense of unlawful entry, appellant respectfully submits that the comt below should
he reversed and that his case should be remanded.
Respectfully submitted,

RA Y~IOND S. SHUEY
343 South Sixth East
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for Appellant

